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sumption of a prior valid ceremonial marriage. With the possible
exception, however, of the case of Shank v. Wilson, supra, that doc-

trine has not been applied without certain qualifications. For instance,
the doctrine was not applied where the evidence showed positively that
there had been no prior valid marriage, nor was the doctrine applied
in the earlier cases where the testimony was silent as to the manner
of the commencement of the relation. It will be noted, however, that
the later cases seem to hold that where such proof is silent the presumption will arise. Where there is evidence of a ceremonial wedding,
the presumption of the validity of the ceremony will be indulged even
though such evidence be contradicted.
Perhaps the only safe deduction that can be drawn from the
decisions is that the presumption favors the legality of a marriage
only when the case is tried on the theory that there had been a valid
marriage, although the dicta in the cases would indicate that the court
would find in favor of the validity of the marriage on proof of cohabitation and reputation alone.
Burton J. Wheelon.

RECENT CASES
CnATirEs-LxAIrITY FOR SERVANT'S NEGLIGExcE.-T, for pay, became a
patient at defendant's hospital, operated as a charitable institution. A student
nurse negligently failed to remove an aluminum hot water bottle from the
bed wherein the patient was placed after the operation. T sued the defendant
corporation for injuries sustained, alleging negligence by the nurse in her care
of him and negligence by the defendant in the selection and retention of the
nurse assigned to take care of him. Held. T could recover only on the latter
ground. Tribble v. Mdssionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 37 Wash. Dec.
285, 242 Pac. 37- (1926).
The tort liability of a charitable corporation for the negligence of its
servants and agents is a perplexing question. Some courts insist that the
liability for a pay patient, at least, should be that of an ordinary private
corporation either because of the public interest in the careful performance of
the duties assumed by the corporation or because exemption from liability is
a legislative and not a judicial matter. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12
R. I. 411 (1879), though by statute now contra; Tucker v. Mobile Infrmary
Association, 191 Ala. 57., 68 So. 4, L. R. A. 1915D 1167 (1915), City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354, (1923).
Other courts go to the other extreme and exempt charitable corporations
from all liability to beneficiaries even for negligence in selecting servants or
agents. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 2035 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392,
14 A. L. R. 563, Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W
453 (1907) Hamburger v. Cornell University, 204 App. Div. 664, 199 N. Y. S.
369 (1923), (fee-paying student). Ordinarily, if due care has been used in
selecting servants, no liability for the torts of the servant is recognized. See

cases rnfra.
This exemption from liability does not ordinarily extend to strangers or
employes injured, and they may recover. Hordyn v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y.
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933, 99 N. E. 696 (1910), Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Assoc., 73 N. H.
556, 64 Atl. 190, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496; Thomas v. German General Benevolent
Society, 168 Cal. 183, 141 Pac. 1186 (1914). Yet in several cases no recovery
was allowed. Whittaker v. St. Lukes Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S. W
1189 (1909), O'Neill v. Odd Fellows Home of Oregon, 89 Or. 389, 174 Pac.
148 (1918), Bachman v. Y W C. A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N. W 751 (1999).
The reasons for exempting charitable corporations from liability are various and for the most part unsatisfactory Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Assocation, 191 Ala. 579, 68 So. 4, L. R. A. 1915D, 1167. In Henot's Hospital v.
Doss, 19 Cl. & F 507, the explanation was suggested that charitable funds are
held in trust for charitable purposes and that it is a breach of trust to apply
them to a foreign purpose such as damages. The English reasoning, although later
discredited by Mersey Docks, etc., Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, was
followed somewhat in America. Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555,
60 N. W 49, 95 L. I. A. 609, 45 Am. St. Rep. 497 (1894), Mortonv. Savannah
Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918), St. Mary's Academy of Sisters of
Loretto of City of Denver v. Solomon, 988 Pac. 99 (Colo., 1995), are illustrative
of this view.
Other cases suggest that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply
to charitable corporations for the reason that the so called servant or agent
is really not acting for the profit of the master, but is acting as an independent
contractor. And sometimes it is put on the basis of being contrary to public
policy to invoke the doctrine. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98,
33 AUt. 595, 31 L. R. A. 994 (1895) Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 939
N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199; Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital, etc., 924 InI.
App. 367 (1999) are illustrative of this class of cases.
Still other cases reasoned that the beneficiary accepted the risk of injury
when he accepted the charity. Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 47 C. C.
A. 99, 109 Fed. 994 (1901), Bruce v. Methodist Church, 147 Mich. 930,
110 N. W 95 (1907), Thomas v. German Benevolent Society, 168 Cal. 183, 141
Pac. 1186 (1914) are illustrative of this class of cases.
Each view undoubtedly expresses some truth, but if carried to its logical
conclusion charitable corporations would be granted complete immunity and
not the partial immunity recognized by most cases. Each view has been subjected
to rigorous criticism by the courts. See Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I.
99, 88 At. 190, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1144; Bruce v. Methodist Church, supra;
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, supra, which illustrate the criticism
offered. The true ground of the partial immunity granted seems to be that
the resources of charity should remain ummpaired to the fullest extent consistent with public safety and the public interest in the non-negligent adnunistration of charity. The existence of complete liability would tend to curtail charitable effort. See McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, supra; Vermillion
v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649 (1916) Tucker
v. Mobile Infirmary Association, supra.
The view adopted in the principal case is the view upheld in practically
all the recent cases and is held by most of the courts in America. It protects
charitable funds against excessive diminution and also public interest in the
careful administration of charity. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, supra;
Bishop )Zandall Hospital v. Hartley 94 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385, 8 L. R. A.
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(N. S.) 161 (1916) Deming Ladies' Hospital Association v. Prce, 276 Fed.
668 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1921).
C. H.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FATH AND CREDIT--DEFAULT JUDGmT.-In
the case of Roche v. McDonald, 36 Wash. Dec. 258, 939 Pac. 1015 (1925), recovery upon an Oregon judgment was denied by the Washington court. The
original judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of Spokane County
against the appellant's assignor. Before the expiration of the time allowed by
the Washington statute of limitations (Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 459, 460), action
was instituted in the Oregon state courts upon the Washington judgment.
Personal service was had in Oregon upon the defendant, who demurred. The
demurrer was overruled and defendant refused to answer upon the merits.
The six year period allowed in Washington elapsed just after the demurrer was
filed and before the final judgment in favor of the plaintiff was rendered.
The plaintiff in Oregon came to Washington and sought to enforce his judgment. The lower court refused to recognize the same and on appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and Held. (1) The
judgihent of the Oregon court being a judgment by default could be collaterally attacked in this state, citing State ex roL. National Bank v. Hastings,
120 Wash. 283, 207 Pac. 23 (1922) (2) The complaint upon which the Oregon
judgment was rendered did not state a cause of action, it appearing on the
face of the complaint that the Washington statute of limitations had run
against the same.
This case seems to be contrary to the great weight of American authority.
E. Herrick Dodd, Jr. (Umversity of Nebraska Law School), in the March,
1926, issue of the HAavAnD LAw REVIEW says--"A judgment is something more
than a cause of action carried one step farther. It is enforceable under the
'full faith and credit' clause of the U. S. Constitution, even though it is plain
that the court which rendered it was in error and that no cause of action
in reality existed."
The most frequently found exception to the general rule requiring a court
to give full faith and credit to the judgments of foreign states is lack of
jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter. Another exception was
made in the case of Huntington v. Attrell, 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. Ed. 11-03, 13
Sup. Ct. Rep. 224 (1892), where one state court was allowed to go behind the
judgment of a sister state court for the purpose of determining whether the
cause of action was civil or penal.
The decision in the present case did not rest upon any of the recognized
exceptions but rather on the fact that the judgment of the Oregon court was
a default judgment and therefore was subject to collateral attack. Conceding
this judgment to be a default judgment, although it appeared that the defendant entered an appearance for the purpose of a demurrer, should any
difference be made in the general rule of comity:' Based upon logic and
principle it seems that this is a very poor ground for a distinction and the
writer has been unable to find any other court so holding. The general rule
stated in 15 R. C. L. 669, is that a default judgment is just as conclusive
an adjudication between the parties of whatever is essential to support the
judgment, as one rendered after answer and contest. See Sodim v. Sodini,
94 Minn. 301, 102 N. W 861 (1905) also Crouse v. McVickar 207 N. Y. 213,
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100 N. E. 697 (1912). Even where a party has a right to have a judgment set
aside, it must in general be regarded as a subsisting and regular judgment as
to all the world. Winslow v. Anderson, 20 N. C. 1, 32 Am. Dec. 651 (1838).
The holding of this case seems clearly in conflict with Fauntleroy v. Lum,
010 U. S. 930, 50 L. Ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641 (1908), unless a distinction
be made by the fact that the present case was termed a default judgment. In
the Fauntleroy case there was a judgment based upon a mistake and the
Supreme Court of the United States said that it was not within the province
of one state court to say that a judgment of a sister state was based upon
a mistake, when the foreign court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter. Fauntleroy v. L.m was approved in Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U. S. 547,
55 L. Ed. 848, 31 Sup. CL Rep. 679 (1911). "Judgment in special proceedings
to assess benefits for a street opemng cannot be collaterally attacked in a suit
to enjoin sale under such judgment", see also United States v. Morse, -018
U. S. 493, 54 L. Ed. 1123, 31 Sup. CL Rep. 37 (1910), American Express Company v. Mullins, 212 U. S. 311, 53 L. Ed. 525, !29 Sup. CL Rep. 381, 15 Ann.
Cas. 536 (1909). Both cases approve the general rule announced in the case
of Fauntleroy v. Lum.
Since the Oregon court, in the Roche v. McDonald case, had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties (no question on this point being raised),
it is submitted that the Oregon court had the power to render a judgment
which should be regarded as valid and binding in every state in the Umon
until set aside in the court where rendered.
J. H.
Editor's Note-Since the above case-note was written, a note appearing in

the April issue of the

CoLUMxBiA LAw

REvixw (26 CoL. L. REv. 464), takes the

same view as J. H., believing the decision in Roche v. McDonald to be
erroneous.
Coi;RAcrs -

CoaoRATioros -

RELEF GRAnTEO Rao31 ILLEGAL CoNTacr

DI3INI SING CAPrrAL STocx.-A, a corporation, purchased from B, one of its

stockholders, 93 shares of its own stock. Later the management of the corporation changed, and the corporation now seeks to recover the money paid out
in the purchase. The shares were tendered into court for the defendants.
Held: Despite the fact that the transaction was illegal, as contrary to Rem.
Comp. Stat. § 3823, providing that it should be unlawful to pay out to the
stockholders any part of the capital stock, except in some legally prescribed
way, repayment will be directed, since public policy demands it. DuddyRobinson Co. v. Taylor, 37 Wash. Dec. 268, 24-0 Pac. 21 (1926).
A contract by which the capital stock of a corporation would be dimimshed
in any unrecognized manner, is illegal. Rem. Comp. Stat. § 38-03; Tait v.
Piggott, 32 Wash. 344, 73 Pac. 364 (1903), 38 Wash. 59, 80 Pac. 172 (1905)
Tacoma Ledger Co. v. Western Home, etc., Assoc., 37 Wash. 467, 79 Pac. 992
(1905), Union Trust Co. v. Amery, 67 Wash. 1, 1.0 Pac. 539 (1912)
Torguson
v. Apex Mines Co., 74 Wash. 243, 133 Pac. 465 (1913), Kom v. Cody Detective
Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1155, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073 (1913), Brenaman v. Whitehouse, 85 Wash. 355, 148 Pac. 24 (1915).
In general, upon the ground of public policy, the courts refuse to afford
relief where parties have entered into an illegal agreement. But where public
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policy will better be served by granting appropriate relief, then, obviously, it
should be given. WILLisTo ox COiR.ACTs, § 1632.
The statute making this contract illegal is one for the benefit of the public.
Union Trust Co. v. Anery and Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, supra. Any
other holding would, then, defeat the very purpose of the statute.
H. S.
JEOPARDY-CONVICTION OR AcQmTrAL.-In the recent
case of State v. Tucker 37 Wash. Dec. 161, 242 Pac. 363 (1936), the question
raised was whether a person can be punished for violation of a statute of a
state where, for the identical act, he has been prosecuted and acquitted under
a city ordinance. This question has never before been raised in this state and
therefore the court had before it the problem of answering the question for
the first time. The court entered into a discussion of the authorities and upon
consideration, involving decisions in many states, decided that the acquittal
under the city ordinance was no bar to the subsequent prosecution under the
statute of the state.
It had been previously decided in this state in the case of State v. Coss,
12 Wash. 673, 42 Pac. 127 (1895) and affirmed in many cases since then, that a
conviction or acquittal under a federal statute was no bar to a subsequent
prosecution by the state for the violation of its law, on the ground that the
same act may constitute two offenses, one against each of the sovereigns to
whose laws the defendant is amenable.
CRftMINAL LAw-FoaDixE

The greatest argument advanced to support the theory that the conviction or acquittal under a city ordinance is to be considered a former jeopardy
or autrefois acquit as to a subsequent prosecution by the state for the same
act is that a city or a municipal corporation is a child of the state under Rem.
Comp. Stat. § 8883, which provides for the incorporation of a city, and Rem.
Comp. Stat. § 8966, which provides for the powers of the city. It is said that
the city is therefore an agent of the state and to allow a double prosecution
would be to allow the state, once directly and once through an agency, to
prosecute the same act. State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215 (1869)
People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W 1124, 4 L. R. A. 751 (1889)
State v. Cowan,
29 Mo. 330 (1860), and Grafton v. United States, 906 U. S. 333, 51 L. Ed. 1084,
27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 749, 11 Ann. Cas. 640 (1907).
The court after a consideration of these cases says, "However sound may
be the theory upon which is based the conclusion that a prosecution under
either ordinance or statute is a bar to a subsequent prosecution, the weight of
authority seems to favor a contrary rule and it is generally held that an act
may be in violation of both state law and municipal ordinance, and a conviction or acquittal for the violation of one is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the violation of the other." Cooixy ox Co nSTTUToxAL LirITAiofs
(6th ed.) p. 239- 8 R. C. L. 150; 16 C. J. 281, Ann. Cas. 19120, 37.
G. DeG.
DIVORCE--SuPPORT

OF CHILDREN-IrAATs--NECESSAIs---COLLEGE

EDUCA-

wife secured a divorce from E in 191a, the decree awarding her alimony and the custody of the two infant daughters. One had reached her
majority at the time of the present suit. The ex-wife sought a modification
of the decree, asking for an additional $60 per month to enable her propTIOI.-E's
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erly to support the remaining infant daughter. The obvious reason for the
request was found in the fact that the extra funds were necessary to enable
the daughter to complete her college course, which she was taking as a preparation to becoming a teacher of English. The girl had completed her high school
course in approximately one-half the customary time by attending summerschool, had shown exceptional brilliance in her studies, particularly in the
classics, and had given every indication that her mind was exceptionally well
suited for the profession for which the college training was a necessary
prerequisite. Moreover, a highly nervous physical makeup precluded her
from entering on a commercial career. E was a railway conductor with a
salary of $3,000 per year and had mcome-producing securities valued at
approximately $10,000. Held. Decree modified, such a collocation of circumstances warranting the finding that the college education was necessary to
the proper fruition of the infant's proven potentialities. The court based
its decision on the broad general principle that what constitutes necessaries is
a relative question of fact depending on the social and economic status of the
infant and the parents, the inherent characteristics of the infant, and her
probable prospects in future life based on her present affirmative indications.
Esteb v. Esteb, 38 Wash. Dec. 174, (1926).
Blackstone defined necessaries as, "Meat, drink, apparel physic, and other
necessaries; and likewise for his good teacing and instructions, whereby he
may profit himself afterwards." 1 CooLEY's BL.cEToxE, 412. Courts generally have included some sort of education within the class of necessaries from
early times. The early cases, however, seem to have confined this to an elementary or vocational education. In no case have we been able to find a court,
previous to the Washington decision, supra, holding a college education to be a
necessary.
The case of Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683, 4- Am. Dec. 537
(1844), is apparently the grandfather of judicial decisions on the question of
the amount of education necessary for an infant. In that case it was felt that
a good common-school education was all that was required and as the infant
had shown no unusual mental capacity and his patrimony was very moderate,
the holding is no doubt sound. However, the opinion intimates that had the
boy given indications of peculiar gemus or talent or had the education been
necessary to the knowledge and practice of some "meehanie art," the college
training nught have been held a necessary. This case was decided in 1844 and it
is submitted that were the case to arise now, in view of evolved economic conditions, "particular arts" might well be substituted for "mechanic arts" and
yet maintain the integrity of the opinion's purpose.
The New York case of InternationalText-Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y.
188, 99 N. E. 722 (19102), though holding that a "Complete Five Year Course
in Steam Engineering" was not a necessary for an ordinary, normal infant,
suggests that specialized higher education might well become so when the
infant's qualifications and other circumstances warrant such finding.
Non-necessaries: Religious education, St. John's Parish v. Bronson, 40
Conn. 75, 16 Am. Rep. 17 (1873), College education, Middlebury College v.
Chandler supra; Medical education, Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357, 35 Am.
Rep. 574 (1880) Legal education, Streitwolf v.Streitwoif 58 N. J. Eq. 570, 43
AtL 904 (1899), Shorthand, Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand 4 Business Untversity, 126 Ga. 681, 55 S. E. 9-99 (1906).
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Generally. Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245, 44 Am. Rep. 759 (1882) Wallin v.
Highland Park Co., 127 Ia. 131, 102 N. W 839 (1905) Pardey v. American
Shtp-Windlass Co., 20 R. I. 147, 37 AtU. 706 (1897), White v. Sikes, 129 Ga.
508, 59 S. E. 228 (1907) Stone v. Denntson, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec.
654 (1882) International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, supra; Lem v. Centaur
Motor Co., 194 Ill. App. 509 (1915), Bear's Adm'x. v. Bear 131 Va. 147, 109
S. E. 313 (1921).
It would seem from an analysis of the spirit of the preceding cases that
the holding of the Washington Supreme Court is no sortie into the field of
judicial speculation, but a logical and just extension of long-established principle, notable both in reasoning and result
T. M. G.
E0.UIT--SPECIFIC PERFORMAN'CE OF Co-OPERATIVE MARKETING AOaEaMEmNT--

MuTufiaTY or REarEDY.-Action by a co-operative marketing association to
secure an injunction, an accounting and specific performance of a grower's
contract to sell to the plaintiff all of the produce raised on the grower's premises during a specified period. The plaintiff agreed to resell the produce so to
be purchased, and the grower's remuneration was to depend on the amount
received from the re-sale by the plaintiff. Defendant demurs on the ground
that he has no mutuality of remedy, in that he could not enforce specific performance against the plaintiff because the latter's agreement to re-sell involved
personal services. Held. Demurrer overruled. An injunction will lie to prevent the grower from selling ls produce to others than the plaintiff. Oregon
Growers' Go-Operative Association v. Riddle, 241 Pac. 1011 (Ore., 1926).
It is to be noted that the court cites Oregon Growers' Co-operative Association v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 212 Pac. 811 (1923), as determining the point
raised by the defense of want of mutuality. In the Lentz case specific performance was not given, but an injunction granted on the principle of Montague v. Flockton, 42 L. J., Ch. 67, L R. 16 Eq. 189, 28 L. T. 580, 21 V R. 668
(1873), that an injunction will lie to enforce the implied negative covenant,
although there may be effective defenses to the prayer for specific performance.
The defense raised in the Lentz case was that of continuous performance and
personal services, and not want of mutuality. Therefore, in the instant case,
the true basis of decision is that there is an equitable remedy to fit the situation (i. e., injunction) so that the complaint is not demurrable, and the
efficacy of the defense of want of mutuality is only approached indirectly.
The inference might fairly be drawn from the two cases that the defense of
want of mutuality as sought to be applied here, and on the same set of facts,
would be upheld in Oregon if the additional remedy of injunction were not
also requested, although the head note to the instant case is directly contrary.
As used in the case under discussion, the defense of want of mutuality goes
to the absence of the simultaneous right for the remedy of specific performance.
This is one of the two generally accepted American theories of mutuality.
The other one bases the defense on the lack of mutuality of remedy, whether
legal or equitable, at the time the decree is sought. 25 R. C. L. 2334; 35 Crc.
622; PoxsiEoy, EctiTy JURisPRUDENcE, § 2191 et seq., 23 CALIFoRNIA JURisPRUDENcE, §§ 19, 20.
A third conception is the older English view that regards the original con-
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tract obligation, rather than the relief or form of relief sought FRet, SPzcie
PmnaoAxcE (6th ed.), c. VIII, pp. 219 et seq. California strictly interprets
the first American theory mentioned, and not only refuses to grant specific
performance but also to grant an injunction in a suit by an association where the grower might be prevented from seeking equitable relief
against the association. Poultry Growers of Southern California v. Barlow,
189 Cal. 278, 208 Pac. 93 (1922). This decision from a code state is to be
contrasted with the holding in Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association v.
Stovall, 113 Tex. 273, 253 S. W 1101 (1923), in which both injunction and
specific performance were granted on much the same facts. In both cases
the defense of want of mutuality of equitable remedy was interposed. In
Washington injunctions have been consistently granted. The question of
want of mutuality has not been adjudicated. Washington Cranberry Growers
Assoc. v. Moore, 117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773, 204 Pac. 811 (1922), Washington Co-Operative Egg and Poultry Assoc. v. Taylor, 1W2 Wash. 406, 210 Pac.
806 (1922) Pierce County Dairymen's Assoc. v. Templin, 124 Wash. 567, 215
Pac. 352 (1923). For a thorough analysis of marketing contracts and the
rights and remedies of the parties see "The Law of California Co-Operative
Marketing Associations," 8 CAL. L. RV. .281, 384; 9 CAL. L. REv. 44.
W S. T.

BOOK REVIEWS
ThE Cows==oro " or THE Uwiruo STATES. By James M. Beck. New York:
Geo. H. Doran Co., 1924, pp. xuv, 352.
The story of the Constitution of the United States has been told in an interesting manner by the Solicitor General of the United States under the foregoing title. The book here reviewed is the result of a series of lectures given
in London in 1922 and 1923 under the auspices of the University of London and
of Gray's Inn. The lectures were published in England, France, and the United
States and were eventually expanded into the present volume.
Mr. Beck, in his introduction, represents the Constitution as a span of our
national life. "Society," he declares, quoting Edmund Burke, "is a continuing
and very sacred compact between the dead, the living, and the unborn." He
rejects the notion of Mr. Jefferson that the Constitution is "for the living, and
not for the dead." It would indeed be unfortunate should graveyard government prevail in the United States, as some would have it On the other hand,
we cannot ignore or dismiss the past, as Jefferson would do. Mr. Beck strikes
the right balance. The Constitution is a rule of government for the living.
The living owe to the dead a solemn debt to transmit to the unborn the heritage
of the past.
Mr. Beck has attempted to get away from the traditional headings of
treatises on the Constitution, and has regarded his subject as a sort of drama.
The conflict of plans and ideas before the Convention he calls the "opening
of the battle." Hamilton, setting forth his ideas, and criticising the other
plans, is described as: "Mr. Hamilton takes the floor." The deadlock over a
federal or national government he calls "the crisis." The compromise is designated as "the dawn." The closing deliberations are described under the heading, "The Curtain Falls." The judiciary is called "the balance wheel." The
present dissatisfactions and controversies concerning the Constitution are aptly
termed "A rising or setting sun?" While some of the analogies are overdrawn,
the titles are intriguing, and compel the reader to want to know more. The
author has levied on the more critical issues, the more exciting incidents, and
the spectacular events and personalities connected with the Constitution and ite
history. Keeping in mind the large and popuiar audience for which Mr.

